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guage seems correct, the practitioner is advised to approach this case
with caution. The court made no mention of the significance of the
fact that the tender of the fees was made by check. 95 The law is well
settled that a check is not legal tender when it is refused on the express
ground that it is not the accepted mode of payment. 9 The practitioner
is advised to tender cash at the time of service regardless of the holding
in the instant case.
ARTIcLE

30 - REMEDIES AND PLEADING

CPLR 3020: Action dismissed on the ground of defective verification.
Since 1965, RPAPL section 741 has required verification of complaints served in summary proceedings. Presumably, the purpose of
this requirement is to subject the affiant to prosecution for perjury"
if he willfully misstates the facts. However, "[w]ith rare exceptions,
district attorneys will not undertake to prosecute a perjury alleged to
emanate from a civil proceeding."9 8
In 46 Downing Street Corp. v. Loren,99 the defendant-tenant
moved to dismiss a summary holdover proceeding on the ground that
verification of the petition was defective. It was discovered that the
signature of the landlord's agent was not genuine. In dismissing the
action under CPLR 3020,100 Judge Lane addressed himself to the pernicious practice under which city marshalls complete standard petitions and notices of petition in summary proceedings in lieu of the
plaintiff or his attorney. While acknowledging that this procedure is
not illegal, he stressed its inherent dangers. 1' 1 Specifically, he warned
95 While a valid tender must ordinarily be made in money, a tender by check is valid

if not objected to on that ground. E.g., Mitchell v. Vermont Copper Mining Co., 67 N.Y.
280, 282 (1876); Murphy v. Mahoney, 187 Misc. 316, 63 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. Broome
County
1946).
90
In re Collyer, 124 App. Div. 16, 108 N.Y.S. 600 (2d Dep't 1908). It appears that one
who is subpoenaed as a witness would succeed on a motion to quash the subpoena on the
ground that payment of the witness fees were tendered by check where such tender was
refused for the stated reasons that payment in cash is desired and that a check is not
legal tender. Grussy v. Schneider, 50 How. Pr. 134 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1875), aff'd, 55
How. Pr. 188 (1st Dep't 1876).
97 N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 210 (McKinney 1967).
98 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3020, commentary at 200 (Supp. 1971).
99 67 Misc. 2d 737, 324 N.YS.2d 932 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
100 Id., citing Sandy Mark Realty Corp. v. Creswell, 67 Misc. 2d 630, 324 N.YS.2d
504 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct N.Y. County 1971).
101 Marshalls may make incurable jurisdictional errors or use improper forms, necessitating recommencement of actions. 67 Misc. 2d at 738, 324 N.YS.2d at 933, citing Kings
East v. Crowell, 161 N.Y.L.J. 113, June 11, 1969, at 17, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
In the latter case, the petition did not state that the apartment in issue was decontrolled,
as required by RPAPL § 741. This defect was deemed jurisdictional, and the court warned
of the danger in merely "filling in the blanks on a printed form." Id.

1972]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

that a marshall would commit perjury if he signs for a landlord's agent,
102
as was apparently done in this case.
The lamentable reluctance of our district attorneys to prosecute
those who commit perjury in civil actions is in significant part responsible for the practice so rightfully condemned in the instant case.
Judge Lane is to be commended for his righteous indignation about
this blatant misuse of the judicial process.
31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101(d): Discovery limited to reports received prior to rejection
of claim.
ARTICLE

While "all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action ' 103 is subject to disclosure, material prepared for
litigation need not be disclosed unless: (1) it can no longer be duplicated, and (2) failure to disclose will cause undue hardship.104 The
scope of this conditional immunization has been a source of extensive
litigation, especially in regard to insurance companies' investigative
reports. 0 ; At what point do reports prepared by independent investigators for an insurance company become entitled to the conditional
protection of CPLR 3101(d)?
At issue in Millen Industries, Inc. v. American Mutual Liability
Insurance Co., 06 was whether such reports concerning dishonest acts
of employees of a policyholder were protected. The Appellate Division,
First Department, determined that: (1) the business of the defendant
included payment or rejection of claims, and (2) reports which aided
in such determinations were made in the ordinary course of business
rather than in preparation for litigation. Subsequent reports, however,
were held to be within the ambit of CPLR 3101(d).'0
CPLR 3120(a): Discovery of defendant hospital's non-medical records
relating to non-party.
In Mayer v. Albany Medical Center Hospital,0 8 the Appellate
Division, Third Department, approved disclosure of non-medical information concerning a patient who had assaulted a visitor in the de102 67 Misc. 2d at 738, 324 N.YS.2d at 933, citing N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 210 (McKinney

1967).
103 CPLR 8101(a).
104 CPLR 3101(d).
1053 WK&M
3101.50b.
106 37 App. Div. 2d 816, 324 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Ist Dep't 1971) (per curiam).
107 Id., 324 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
108 37 App. Div. 2d 1011, 325 N.Y.S.2d 517 (3d Dep't 1971) (mem.).

